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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Jurisdiction is vested in this Court for consideration of this Appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the Court of Appeals err when it sustained the trial court's grant of an 
injunction against the Plaintiffs/Appellants (the "Owners"), enjoining the Owners from 
interfering with the Defendant/Appellee's ("Wendy's5') sole and exclusive use of the 
Owners' property? In making this determination the Utah Supreme Court gives no 
deference to the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals and reviews the decision for 
correctness. Hansen v. Eyre, 116 P.3d 290, 292 (Utah 2005). 
DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Court of Appeals' decision is found at 2007 UT App 211; 580 Utah Adv. Rep. 
13. A foil copy of the opinion is included in the Appendix to this Brief. 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There are no statutory provisions which are controlling or determinative of this 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Owners ask the Utah Supreme Court to find that the Court of Appeals erred in 
affirming an injunction issued by the Third District Court. 
The case was filed by the Owners in the Third District Court on claims of Trespass 
and Breach of contract. Wendy's answered the Owners' Complaint and filed a 
1 
Counterclaim seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. On Wendy's motion for summary 
judgment, the trial court granted the motion and enjoined the Owners from taking any 
action that would interfere with Wendy's continued use of Drive-Through Facilities 
located on the Owners' property. On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals determined that 
portions of the trial court's summary judgment decision were incorrect and remanded the 
matter for proceedings on those portions of the case. However, the Court of Appeals also 
held that the Owners' trespass and breach of contract claims were barred by the statute of 
limitations, and that the injunction requested by Wendy's in its counterclaim, and issued 
by the trial court, was proper. The effect of the ruling of the Court of Appeals is to vest 
Wendy's with the sole and exclusive use of the Owners' property. Owners are enjoined 
from any further use of the drive-through property at issue. A Statement of Relevant 
Facts of the Case follows. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Defendant/Appellee Wendy's Old Fashioned Hamburgers of New York, 
Inc. ("Wendy's") owns the real property located at 3259 East 3300 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah (the "Wendy's Property"), on which is located a restaurant building and related 
improvements. R. at 119, ^  1. 
2. The Wendy's Property is adjacent to the Canyon Rim Shopping Center (the 
"Shopping Center"), which is owned by Plaintiffs/Appellants ("Owners"). R. at 119, t 2 . 
3. Both the Wendy's Property and the Shopping Center are included in the 
property described in a Declaration, which was recorded in the office of the Salt Lake 
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County Recorder on September 24, 1982 as Entry No. 3714292, in Book 5410, at Page 
823. R. at 119,13. 
4. The Declaration identifies three distinct parcels of property within the 
property described therein. The Wendy's Property is located within what the Declaration 
refers to as "Parcel Three." R. at 119, f 5. 
5. The Wendy's Property was developed as a Burger King restaurant in or 
about 1982. R. at 120, | 6 . 
6. At the time the Burger King restaurant was constructed on the Wendy's 
Property in or about 1982, a drive-through lane was also constructed on the north side of 
the Wendy's Property. The drive-through lane is bounded on the north by a narrow, 
landscaped island edged with concrete curbing, and on the south by the restaurant (the 
drive-through lane and related island are referred to hereinafter as the "Drive-Through 
Facilities"). Rat 120,17. 
7. The Drive-Through Facilities extend from the northwest comer of the 
restaurant located on the Wendy's Property to the northeast onto the Owners' property. 
R. at 80,1 11. 
8. The Owners' property which is encumbered by the Drive-Through 
Facilities is identified in the Declaration as a portion of the "Common Area" of the 
Shopping Center. R. at 80, Tf 11. 
9. The Declaration contains an Exhibit A, referred to as the Plot Plan. The 
Plot Plan is a proposed site plan for the Canyon Rim Shopping Center. R. at 79, f 6. 
3 
10. The Plot Plan shows the Drive-Through Facilities as two curved lines 
running from the northwest comer of the restaurant located on the Wendy's Property to 
the northeast. R. at 7. 
11. With respect to Parcel Three, the Declaration provides that "[n]o building 
featuring drive-in, drive-up or drive-through traffic shall be located on Parcel Three, 
except as shown on the Plot Plan . . . ." R. at 38. 
12. The physical relationship between the location of the Wendy's building and 
the Drive-Through Facilities as shown on the Plot Plan is not consistent in scale with the 
physical location of the Wendy's building and Drive-Through Facilities as physically 
located on the ground. R. at 280, f 8. 
13. The Wendy's building, as built, begins approximately 8 feet farther from 
the North edge of the 33rd South right-of-way and is approximately 13 feet longer than 
the building shown on the Plot Plan. R. at 280, f 9. 
14. With respect to signage on Parcel Three, the Declaration states that: 
The Owner of Parcel Three shall have the right to construct 
two (2) free-standing pylon, monument or other signs at the 
location designated on the Plot Plan as "Parcel Three Sign." 
No other pylon, monument or other free-standing sign shall 
be permitted on Parcel Three without the prior written 
approval of all Owners . . . . 
R. at 39, 40. 
15. In November, 2002, Wendy's became aware that the Drive-Through 
Facilities then being operated by Burger King encroached upon Owners' property 
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through a survey commissioned by Wendy's and performed by Larsen & Malmquist. R. 
at 151,13; 261,11. 
16. Shortly thereafter a representative of Wendy's contacted Mark Papanikolas, 
a representative of the Owners, to inquire about purchasing an easement over Owners' 
property. R. at 261,12. 
17. In December, 2002, Owners notified Wendy's that Owners would not allow 
drive-through facilities to be located on Owners' property without compensation being 
paid to Owners. R. at 261,13. 
18. On or about February 28, 2003, Wendy's purchased the Burger King 
Restaurant property located at 3259 East 3300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah and converted 
the restaurant from a Burger King to a Wendy's. R. at 262,14. 
19. Following the purchase by Wendy's of the Burger King properly, Wendy's 
replaced the Burger King free-standing signs and added additional free-standing and 
monument signs, at least one of which is alleged to have been constructed on Owners' 
property. R. at 262,15; 287. 
20. Wendy's is currently maintaining the Drive-Through Facilities and 
landscaped area as shown on the Larsen & Malmquist survey to be on Owners' property 
and has planted and continues to maintain flowers, shrubs and grass on Owners' property, 
together with one of Wendy's signs. R. at 262,16. 
2L In addition to a pylon sign along 3300 South at the south end of the 
Wendy's Property, and a directional sign located on the Drive-Through Facilities, 
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Wendy's also constructed two additional menu-board signs on the Wendy's Property (the 
"Menu-Board Signs"). R. at 254, f 5, 283, ffif 8-9. 
22. In July, 2004, Owners filed suit against Wendy's alleging trespass and 
breach of contract based on the location of Wendy's Drive-Through Facilities on 
Owners' property. R. at 1. 
23. Wendy's answered Owners' Complaint and filed a Counterclaim that 
included a request for an injunction. R. at 14. 
24. Wendy's brought a Motion for Summary Judgment on Owners' claims and 
on Wendy's counterclaims on September 30, 2005. R. at 114. 
25. A hearing was held on Wendy's motion on December 12, 2005. R. at 306. 
26. On December 12, 2005, the Court entered a Minute Entry granting 
Wendy's Motion for Summary Judgment. In the Minute Entry the Court states: 
After reviewing the record in this matter, as well as the 
applicable Utah law, the Court finds the proper focus in a 
statute of limitations analysis is the time at which the cause of 
action accrued, not the identity of the parties involved. See 
Utah Dep't of Envlt Quality v Redd, 2002 UT 50, H 16, 48 
P.3d 230 {citing Utah Code Ann., § 78-12-1). While the 
Plaintiffs' suggest the trespass is continuing, rather than 
permanent and, therefore, their lawsuit is timely, the Court 
disagrees. At issue in this case is a landscaped island edged 
with concrete curbing, which is considerably more permanent 
than the pile of "rocks, soil, and other debris" which 
constituted the act of trespass contested in Brieggar 
Properties, L.C. v. H.E. Davis & Sons, Inc., 2002 UT 1953, p. 
11, 52 P.3d 1133. This said, it is undisputed the alleged 
trespass and breach of the Declaration occurred in or about 
1982 and, consequently, the causes of action are time barred. 
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Based upon the foregoing, the Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment is granted. Defendant is asked to prepare 
the appropriate affidavit of fees and submit the same for 
consideration by the Court. 
R. at 307. 
27. The trial court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Final 
Judgment in this matter on March 21, 2006. R. at 375. 
28. The Court of Appeals entered its final decision on June 21, 2007. A copy of 
the decision of the Court of Appeals is included in the appendix to this Petition. 
29. In its decision, the Court of Appeals states: 
}^28 Although, "[i]n addition to damages, [a] plaintiff may 
seek to stop the conduct that is creating the trespass," and 
although "issuance of an injunction to remove the 
encroachment remains discretionary with the court," 9 
Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property § 64A.05[8] 
(Michael Allen Wolf ed. 2007), the question here is whether 
an equitable remedy of removal is still available after the 
statute of limitations has run. The parties do not cite, and we 
do not find, any Utah law directly on point. In at least one 
state, however, courts have held that requests for injunctive 
relief for the removal of permanent trespasses on property are, 
like trespass claims, barred by the three-year statute of 
limitations. See Field-Escandon v. DeMann, 251 Cal. Rptr. 
49, 52-53 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); see also Troeger v. Fink, 332 
P.2d 779, 782, 783 (Ca. Ct. App. 1958) (stating that "causes 
of action for damages and for injunctive relief accrue when 
the [permanent] trespass is committed and are barred three 
years thereafter" and that "[gjenerally, the running of an 
applicable statute of limitations will also bar equitable 
relief). 
TJ29 This approach makes sense. After all, the three-year 
statute of limitations bars any trespass "action." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-26(1). Therefore, Plaintiffs cannot assert the 
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trespass action that would support their remedy - regardless 
of whether that remedy is equitable or is for damages. 
1J30 Even if this were not the case, the Utah Supreme Court 
has held that "[e]quitable claims will be barred after the time 
fixed by the analogous statute of limitations unless 
extraordinary circumstances make the application unjust." 
CIG Exploration, Inc. v. State, 2001 UT 37,1[11, 24 P.3d 966; 
see also Hatch v. Hatch, 46 Utah 116, 148 P. 1096, 1101 
(1915) ("Generally, in the state courts, the statute of 
limitations applies to equitable as well as legal actions."). 
207 UTApp 21 l , t f 28-30. 
30. The Owners filed a Petition for Certiorari on July 23, 2007, and this Court 
subsequently granted the Owners' Petition. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The decision of the Court of Appeals in this case sustained the injunction issued 
by the trial court. This decision of the Court of Appeals is in conflict with prior precedent 
of this Court. The decision allows Wendy's to continue its sole and exclusive use of 
Owners' property, despite the fact that Wendy's has no ownership interest in the 
property. This is contrary to the policy set forth by this Court in Nyman v. Anchor 
Development, L.L.C., 2003 UT 27, 73 P.3d 357. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is also incorrect because it awarded 
affirmative relief to Wendy's on its Counterclaim in the form of an injunction prior to 
any determination on the merits that would support the injunction. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION IN THIS CASE 
SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE IT CONFLICTS 
WITH PRIOR PRECEDENT OF THIS COURT. 
In its opinion in this case, the Court of Appeals found that the injunction issued by 
the trial court was proper. The Court reached this result through reliance on case law from 
the State of California which holds that requests for injunctive relief for the removal of 
permanent trespasses on property are, like the trespass claims, barred by the same statute 
of limitations. See Papanikolas v. Wendy's, 207 UT App. 211, ^ 28-29. As a result of 
that decision, the trial court's Order, which prevents the Owners from taking any action 
which would inhibit Wendy's use of the Drive-Through Facilities, has been sustained. 
It is undisputed that Wendy's use of the Drive-Through Facilities is completely 
exclusive of any use the Owners could make of their own property. Therefore, the 
injunctive order issued by the trial court, and sustained by the Court of Appeals, has 
created a situation where Wendy's has the sole and exclusive use and possession of the 
Owners' property. They have obtained this right despite the absence of any legal 
ownership interest in the property and despite the fact the Court of Appeals specifically 
declined to address the issue of whether or not the Declaration in this case authorizes 
Wendy's trespass. See Papanikolas v. Wendy's, 207 UT App. 211, f 20. 
The aforementioned decision of the Court of Appeals, granting Wendy's the sole 
and exclusive use of Owners' property, is contrary to the decision of this Court in Nyman 
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v. Anchor Development, LLC, 2003 UT 27, 73 P.3d 357. In Nyman, a property owner 
sought a judgment of adverse possession or, in the alternative, a prescriptive easement 
where he had constructed his garage partially on a neighbor's property. This Court denied 
the appellant's claim to a prescriptive easement on the basis that the appellant's proposed 
use was exclusive of the primary owner's use of the property. The opinion of this Court 
states: 
The trial court also rejected Nyman 's alternative argument that 
even if he is not entitled to adverse possession of the disputed 
portion of Lot 17, he has a right to a prescriptive easement 
allowing him to continue to use the property for his garage. 
The trial court held that Nyman's claimed right could not be 
construed as an easement because it would leave Miller, the 
holder of record title, with no rights at all in the disputed 
property. Nyman argues that the trial court erred by granting 
summary judgment to Miller on this issue. 
f 18 "A prescriptive easement is created when the party 
claiming the prescriptive easement can prove that 'use of 
another's land was open, continuous, and adverse under a 
claim of right for a period of twenty years.' " Here, the term 
"use" implies an inherent distinction in the property rights 
conferred by an easement, on the one hand, and outright 
ownership, on the other. "A prescriptive easement does not 
result in ownership, but allows only use of property belonging 
to another for a limited purpose." Mar chant v. Park City, 111 
P.2d 677, 681 (Utah Ct.App.1989), affd, 788 P.2d 520 (Utah 
1990). Thus, we have previously observed that: 
Whenever there is ownership of property subject to an 
easement there is a dichotomy of interests, both of which must 
be respected and kept in balance. On the one hand, it is to be 
realized that the owner of the fee title, because of his general 
ownership, should have the use and enjoyment of his property 
to the highest degree possible, not inconsistent with the 
easement. On the other, the owner of the easement should 
likewise have the right to use and enjoy his easement to the 
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fullest extent possible not inconsistent with the rights of the 
fee owner. 
N. Union Canal Co. v. Newell 550 P.2d 178, 179 (Utah 
1976). Maintaining such a balance between the rights of the 
fee title owner and a purported easement holder becomes 
impossible where the latter asserts a right to permanent 
exclusive occupancy of the fee title owner's land. We 
conclude that the right to keep a garage on another's property 
falls outside the scope of a prescriptive easement, and 
therefore the latter is simply unavailable to Nyman as an 
alternative in this case. Indeed, we know of no prior Utah case 
recognizing a prescriptive easement right to maintain a 
permanent structure on someone else's property. 
Nyman, 2003 UT 27, f 17-18, 73 P.3d 357, 361-362. The Court of Appeals decision in 
this case creates the precise result which this Court found untenable in Nyman: Wendy's 
has the exclusive use and possession of the enclosed drive-through property at issue 
while the Owners, still with "legal title" to the property, are excluded from any use of the 
property whatsoever. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals rests on the notion that where a statute of 
limitations bars a legal action, it also bars the Owner from taking any action to recover its 
property. Papanikolas, 2007 UT App. 211, f28-30. The injunction was sustained without 
any determination by the Court of Appeals on the merits of Wendy's claim of a right to 
continue in sole possession of the property. Despite the fact that Wendy's has alleged a 
cause of action seeking a prescriptive easement in its counterclaim and essentially 
abandoned that claim, the Court of Appeals decision vests the sole and exclusive use of 
the Owners' property in Wendy's wholly on the basis of a statute of limitations 
determination. In short, as a result of the decision of the Court of Appeals, the Owners 
11 
are the owners of property from which they are completely excluded, and Wendy's is in 
exclusive possession of property it does not own. This result is in direct conflict with the 
decision of this Court in Nyman. 
The Court's emphasis in Nyman on the permanent nature of the encroachment is 
highlighted in this case. The designation of the Drive-Through Facilities here as a 
"permanent" trespass is significant. The Court of Appeals explained the distinction 
between "permanent" trespass and "ongoing" trespass, noting that "the act of 
constructing the Drive-Through Facilities was permanent in that "[its] installation 
amountfed] to a single act with a single impact on the land," Papanikolas, 2007 UT App 
211, f25. The Court of Appeals' reasoning rests on the fact that once an act of permanent 
trespass is committed, there is no further contact of an interfering nature with the land. 
The underlying owner is no longer impacted in its use of the property. Given this 
distinction, it is difficult to understand why an owner should be prohibited from using 
self-help to restore its property to its pre-trespass condition. The Court of Appeals 
decision in this case would have prohibited the property owner in Brieggar Properties, 
L.C. v. KE. Davis & Sons, Inc., 2002 UT 53, 52 P.3d 1133,1 from removing the 
offending pile of rocks and debris from his property. This result is unwarranted. The 
Court of Appeals decision on this point should be reversed. 
1
 In Brieggar, the offending trespass was a pile of rocks and other construction debris that 
was mistakenly placed on Brieggar's property. The trespassing party mistakenly dumped 
the material, believing that Brieggar's property belonged to someone else. 
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II. 
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
IMPROPERLY GRANTS AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF TO 
WENDY'S ON THE BASIS OF THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS. 
On certiorari review, this Court will review the decision of the Court of Appeals 
for correctness, focusing on whether that court correctly reviewed the trial court's 
decision under the correct standard of review. Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, 164 P.3d 366. 
In the context of a Summary Judgment Motion, it is the obligation of the trial court and 
the Court of Appeals to view the facts and the inferences to be drawn from them in a light 
most favorable to the non-moving party, here, the Owners. Id. 
In its decision, the Court of Appeals sustained the primary portion of the trial 
court's ruling when it determined that Owners' trespass and breach of contract claims 
were time barred. However, Wendy's request for an injunction is founded on the 
allegations of its Counterclaim, which asserts a right to the current location of the Drive-
Through Facilities based on the terms of the Declaration. The record in this case reveals 
no dispute of fact on the issue of Wendy's encroachment on the Owners' property. R. at 
261, ff 1-2. At the very least, the facts, taken in a light most favorable to the Owners, 
indicate the existence of a genuine dispute of fact as the whether or not the Drive 
Through Facilities of Wendy's are consistent with the Declaration. R. at 280, ^8. 
Therefore, in the context of Wendy's Summary Judgment Motion on which this matter 
was decided, the trial court and the Court of Appeals were precluded by the record from 
13 
concluding that Wendy's Drive-Through Facilities were located in a manner that is 
consistent with the Declaration. 
In support of its decision to sustain the Injunction, the Court of Appeals noted that 
"the question here is whether an equitable remedy of removal is still available after the 
statute of limitations has run." Papanikolas, 2007 UT App 211, ^28. The Court then 
relied on a decision from California and held that because equitable relief should likewise 
be barred by the same statute of limitations applicable to damages actions, the trial 
court's injunction should be sustained. The Court of Appeals' decision rests on the 
incorrect assertion that the Owners were seeking equitable relief to authorize removal of 
the encroachment. In fact, the only injunction at issue before the trial court or the Court 
of Appeals was the injunction issued by the trial court on Wendy's request. Owners' 
request for equitable relief in the matter was not before the Court. 
As noted above, the state of the record in this case prevented any determination 
that Wendy's was not trespassing on Owners' property. Additionally, because the Court 
of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision on the statute of limitations, the Court of 
Appeals stated: 
[2] \ 20 We do not reach the issue of whether the trial court 
correctly interpreted the Declaration, as we agree with the 
trial court that Plaintiffs' trespass and breach of contract 
claims concerning the Drive-Through Facilities are time-
barred. 
Papanikolas, 2007 UT 211, f^ 20. Therefore, without any judgment on the merits of the 
breach of contract claim, the trial court awarded the affirmative relief requested by 
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Wendy's in its Counterclaim. The use of the statute of limitations in this way was legally 
incorrect. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated the law in this manner: 
It is the general rule of wide application that the statute of 
limitations is available in judicial proceedings only as a 
defense and can never be asserted by a plaintiff as a cause of 
action in him or as conferring upon him an affirmative right 
of action. The principle has sometimes been expressed in the 
figure of speech that the statute is available only as a shield, 
not as a sword. 
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 277 F.2d 615, 623-624 (10th Cir. 1960). The 
affirmative relief granted to Wendy's was awarded without any determination of the 
merits and therefore, the injunction issued by the trial court was incorrectly sustained by 
the Court of Appeals. 
CONCLUSION 
From the foregoing, it is clear that the Court of Appeals' decision rests on faulty 
reasoning and an incorrect understanding of the claims of the parties. The trial court and 
the Court of Appeals in this matter determined that Wendy's trespass is permanent. The 
characterization of the trespass as permanent implies a single entry, and a single impact 
on the property. There is, according to this characterization, no ongoing interference with 
the Owners' use of the property. If the reasoning behind the characterization were 
accurate, the Owner would be entitled to, and able to fully use and enjoy the property. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals in this case, while characterizing the trespass as 
permanent, precludes the Owners from any use of their own property and awards the sole 
and exclusive use of the property to Wendy's. This is contrary to any reasoned policy. 
15 
The decision also affirms an injunction awarded to Wendy's on its counterclaim 
without any determination that the counterclaim has merit. The injunction was based 
solely on the Court of Appeals determination that Owners' trespass and breach of 
contract claims are barred by the statute of limitations. It turns the statute from a shield to 
a sword which affords affirmative relief. The decision is also erroneous on this point and 
should be reversed. 
For the foregoing reasons, Owners request that this Court overturn that part of the 
Court of Appeals' decision which upholds the injunction issued by the trial court and 
remand this matter to the trial court for a determination of the merits of the parties' 
remaining claims. The Owners further request an Order awarding them their costs as 
allowed by law. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ ~ day of December, 2007. 
MAZURAN & HAYES, P.C. 
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publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
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BILLINGS, Judge: 
1|l Plaintiffs Papanikolas Brothers Enterprises, L.C. and White 
Investment Co., Inc. appeal the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment to Defendant Wendy's Old Fashioned Hamburgers of New 
York, Inc. (Wendy's). On appeal, Plaintiffs contend the trial 
court erred in interpreting the declaration of restrictions and 
grant of easements and in concluding that the statutes of 
limitations had run on Plaintiffs1 breach of contract and 
trespass claims. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in 
part. 
BACKGROUND1 
1. "In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we . . . view the 
facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the non-moving party." Sanders v. Leavitt, 
2001 UT 78,1(1 n.l, 37 P.3d 1052. "We recite the facts 
accordingly." Id. 
f2 Plaintiffs and Wendy's are adjacent land owners in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. Plaintiffs own the Canyon Rim Shopping Center (the 
Shopping Center), and Wendy's owns property next to the Shopping 
Center (the Wendy's Property), on which it owns and operates a 
fast-food restaurant. 
i|3 Both the Shopping Center and the Wendy's Property are 
located on land parcels described in a declaration of 
restrictions and grants of easements (the Declaration) recorded 
in 1982. The Declaration describes three distinct land parcels. 
The Declaration states that Plaintiffs own parcels one and two. 
The Wendy's Property is located within parcel three. 
^4 The Wendy's Property was originally developed in 1982 as a 
Burger King restaurant. Wendy's purchased the property in early 
2003 and converted the Burger King restaurant to a Wendy's 
restaurant (the Restaurant). 
UB The original development of the Wendy's Property in 1982 
included construction of a drive-through lane on the north side 
of the Wendy's Property. As constructed, the drive-through lane 
was bound on the north by a narrow, landscaped island edged with 
concrete curbing and on the south by the Restaurant (we refer to 
the drive-through lane and the related island as the Drive-
Through Facilities). 
f6 The Declaration limits the construction of buildings with 
drive-through traffic on parcel three, allowing such construction 
only when certain conditions are satisfied. Specifically, the 
Declaration states that 
[n]o building featuring drive-in, drive-up or 
drive-through traffic shall be located on 
[p]arcel [tjhree, except as shown on the 
[p]lot [p]Ian [(the Plot Plan)], without the 
prior written consent of the [ojwner of 
[p]arcel [t]wo and [the lessor of parcel 
one], including consent to the location of 
the drive-in, drive-up or drive-through lanes 
of such facility. Such consent will not be 
unreasonably withheld provided that the 
location of such lanes and the use thereof do 
not impede or inhibit access to and from and 
the conduct of business from the buildings in 
the Shopping Center or access to and from the 
adjacent streets. 
H7 The parties agree that the Plot Plan details the Drive-
Through Facilities as two curved lines running from the northwest 
corner of the Restaurant to the northeast. They also agree that 
the Restaurant and the Drive-Through Facilities have, since the 
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time of their construction, remained in the same location and 
configuration and have remained in continuous use. 
i|8 In addition to the Restaurant and the Drive-Through 
Facilities, there are also a number of signs located on parcel 
three, including two pylon signs and two menu board signs (the 
Menu Board Signs). The Menu Board Signs and one of the parcel 
three pylon signs are located on the Wendy's Property. Although 
menu board signs have continuously existed on the Wendy's 
Property since 1982, Wendy's replaced one of the existing menu 
board signs and installed an additional menu board sign when it 
acquired the property in 2003. The Declaration limits the amount 
and type of signage permitted on parcel three. Specifically, the 
Declaration states that 
[t]he [o]wner of [p] arcel [t]hree shall have 
the right to construct two(2) free-standing 
pylon, monument or other signs at the 
location designated on the Plot Plan as 
"Parcel Three Sign." No other pylon, 
monument or other free-standing sign shall be 
permitted on [p]arcel [tjhree without the 
prior written approval of all [o]wners and 
[the lessor of parcel one]. 
The Declaration also permits, without limit, the construction of 
directional signs within the designated common areas of each 
property parcel. 
^9 In 2004, Plaintiffs filed suit against Wendy's for breach of 
contract and trespass. In 2005, Plaintiffs filed an amended 
complaint, alleging that the Menu Board Signs are not permitted 
by the Declaration and therefore constitute a breach a contract; 
that the Drive-Through Facilities are not physically located "as 
shown on the Plot Plan" and therefore constitute a breach of 
contract; and that the Drive-Through Facilities, and patrons' 
continued use of those facilities, constitute a trespass. 
Plaintiffs also subsequently asserted that Wendy's committed 
trespass and breached the Declaration in maintaining landscaping 
on the Drive-Through Facilities and in constructing a new fence 
and sign on Plaintiffs' property.2 
|^10 Wendy's moved for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' cLaims. 
The trial court granted Wendy's motion for summary judgment, 
concluding that: (1) the Drive-Through Facilities do not violate 
the Declaration, and thus do not constitute a trespass, because 
the Declaration "expressly authorizes [the] Drive[-]Through 
2. The parties and the record do not make clear whether the 
alleged fence and sign are located on the Drive-Through 
Facilities or elsewhere on Plaintiffs' property. 
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Facilities located on [p]arcel [t]hree as shown on the Plot 
Plan"; (2) even if the Drive-Through Facilities constituted a 
breach of contract or trespass, Plaintiffs' claims are barred by 
the relevant statutes of limitations; and (3) the Menu Board 
Signs do not violate the Declaration because the Declaration does 
not explicitly prohibit the signs and, moreover, because the 
Declaration expressly contemplates the operation of a drive-
through restaurant on parcel three, the Declaration must have 
contemplated the erection of menu board signs--"an inherently 
necessary feature of modern drive through restaurants." The 
trial court thus denied Plaintiffs' claims for damages, awarded 
Wendy's "a declaratory judgment decreeing that the Menu Board 
Signs may remain in use in their present location and 
configuration," and "enjoin[ed P]laintiffs from taking any action 
to inhibit Wendy's from using and maintaining the Drive-Through 
Facilities and the Menu Board Signs in their present location and 
configuration." In accordance with a fee provision in the 
Declaration, the trial court awarded costs and attorney fees to 
Wendy's. The fee provision states that 
[i]n the event that legal proceedings are 
brought or commenced to enforce any of the 
terms of th[e] Declaration against any 
[o]wner or other party with an interest in 
the Shopping Center, the successful party in 
such action shall then be entitled to receive 
and shall receive from the defaulting [ojwner 
or party a reasonable sum as attorney [] fees 
and costs, to be fixed by the court in the 
same action. 
In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court 
did not apparently consider Plaintiffs' claims concerning Wendy's 
alleged maintenance of landscaping within the Drive-Through 
Facilities and its purported installation of a new fence and sign 
on Plaintiffs' property. 
Ull Plaintiffs appeal. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
tl2 Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erroneously granted 
Wendy's motion for summary judgment because the court 
misinterpreted the Declaration as a matter of law and misapplied 
the statutes of limitations to Plaintiffs' breach of contract and 
trespass claims. It is well established that "[s]ummary judgment 
is appropriate only where (1) 'there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact' and (2) 'the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law.'" Poteet v. White, 2006 UT 63,1(7, 
147 P.3d 439 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)). "In reviewing a 
grant . . . of summary judgment, [we are] . . . obligated 
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to . . . review the district court's legal conclusions, as well 
as the grant of summary judgment as a whole, for correctness." 
View Condo. Owners Ass'n v. MS1C0 L.L.C. . 2005 UT 91,fl7, 12 7 
P. 3d 697. The trial court's interpretation of the Declaration 
and its application of the statutes of limitations constitute 
legal conclusions. See Green River Canal Co. v. Thavn, 2003 UT 
50,1|16, 84 P. 3d 1134 ("The trial court's interpretation of a 
contract presents a question of law, which we review for 
correctness.")/ Russell Packard Dev. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14,^18, 
108 P.3d 741 ("'The applicability of a statute of 
limitations . . . [is a] question [] of law, which we review for 
correctness.'" (quoting Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24,^32, 44 P. 3d 
742)) . 
ANALYSIS 
1(13 Plaintiffs argue that the trial court improperly granted 
Wendy's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claims of 
trespass and breach of contract. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim 
that the trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that 
the Declaration permits the Menu Board Signs; that the Drive-
Through Facilities do not violate the Declaration; and that the 
Drive-Through Facilities do not constitute a trespass. 
Plaintiffs also aver that the trial court incorrectly ruled that 
Plaintiffs' contract and trespass claims concerning the Drive-
Through Facilities are time-barred by the relevant statutes of 
limitations, and that even if their trespass claim is time-
barred, the trial court cannot prevent Plaintiffs from obtaining 
equitable relief to remove the trespass from their property. 
Plaintiffs further assert that the trial court erred in failing 
to consider their claims of trespass and breach of contract 
regarding the alleged maintenance of landscaping and the 
construction of a new fence and sign on Plaintiffs' property. 
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the trial court improperly 
interpreted the Declaration in awarding costs and attorney fees 
to Wendy's. 
I. Menu Board Signs 
|^l4 Plaintiffs first contend that the trial court erred in 
determining as a matter of law that the Declaration permits the 
Menu Board Signs. The Declaration provides: 
The [o]wner of [p]arcel [t]hree shall have 
the right to construct two(2) free-standing 
pylon, monument or other signs at the 
location designated on the Plot Plan as 
"Parcel Three Sign." No other pylon, 
monument or other free-standing sign shall be 
permitted on [p]arcel [t]hree without the 
prior written approval of all [o]wners 
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Because the parties do not dispute that parcel three currently 
contains two pylon signs, Plaintiffs contend that the Menu Board 
Signs violate the Declaration in that they constitute "other 
free-standing sign[s],n installed without prior written approval, 
in excess of the number of signs permitted by the Declaration. 
fl5 In contrast, Wendy's asserts that the Menu Board Signs do 
not violate the Declaration because they are not the type of 
signs prohibited under the Declaration. Specifically, Wendy's 
contends that the Menu Board Signs are directional in nature and 
thus not limited under the Declaration. 
tl6 In determining that the Declaration does not prohibit the 
Menu Board Signs, the trial court appeared to adopt Wendy's 
classification of the Menu Board Signs as not constituting the 
type of signs--i.e., "pylon, monument or other free-standing"--
limited under the Declaration without prior written approval. 
1|l7 In reviewing the Declaration, " [this court] interpret [s] the 
provisions of the Declaration as we would a contract." View 
Condo. Owners Ass'n v. MSICO, L.L.C. , 2005 UT 91,1(21, 127 P.3d 
697. In so doing, "the intention of the . . . parties is 
controlling." Peterson v. Sunrider Corp. , 2002 UT 43,1|l8, 48 
P.3d 918. Thus, " [i]f the language of the contract is 
unambiguous, the intention of the parties may be determined as a 
matter of law based on the language of the agreement." Id. But, 
" [i]f the contract is found to be ambiguous, the court may 
consider extrinsic evidence of the parties' intentions." Id. 
Accordingly, "a motion for summary judgment may not be granted if 
a legal conclusion is reached that an ambiguity exists in the 
contract and there is a factual issue as to what the parties 
intended." Id. at Kl4 (quotations and citation omitted). "A 
contract provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one 
reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meaning of terms, 
missing terms [,] or other facial deficiencies." Id. at 1Jl9 
(quotations and citations omitted). "To demonstrate ambiguity, 
the contrary positions of the parties must each be tenable." 
Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry , 8 02 
P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990). 
1|18 Unlike the trial court, we do not think the Declaration 
clearly supports Wendy's position that the Menu Board Signs are 
directional signs allowed under the Declaration. To the 
contrary, the Declaration appears silent as to the parties' 
intent regarding the classification and limitation of menu board 
signs, and the agreement gives no indication as to why 
Plaintiffs' position that the Menu Board Signs are of a 
prohibited nature is not equally tenable. Because "[we] ha[ve] 
determined that the [Declaration] is ambiguous and there are 
issues of fact regarding the intention of the parties, summary 
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judgment may not be granted based on contract interpretation." 
Peterson, 2002 UT 43 at i|29; see also id. ("Because the meaning 
of the contract ha[d] not yet been resolved, . . . the trial 
court's reliance on one construction of it to support summary 
judgment was improper."). Thus, we reverse the trial court's 
grant of summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' breach of contract 
claims regarding the Menu Board Signs and remand for an 
evidentiary hearing to determine what the parties to the 
Declaration must have intended as to the signs.3 
II. Drive-Through Facilities 
fl9 Plaintiffs next contend that the trial court erred in 
determining as a matter of law that the Drive-Through Facilities 
do not violate the Declaration and thus do not constitute a 
trespass. Plaintiffs also claim that the trial court erred in 
deciding that Plaintiffs' contract and trespass claims concerning 
the Drive-Through Facilities are time-barred. 
[^2 0 We do not reach the issue of whether the trial court 
correctly interpreted the Declaration, as we agree with the trial 
court that Plaintiffs' trespass and breach of contract claims 
concerning the Drive-Through Facilities are time-barred. 
Plaintiffs' breach of contract claims are time-barred because the 
Drive-Through Facilities were constructed in 1982 and Plaintiffs 
did not file their breach of contract action alleging the 
facilities violated the Declaration until 2004, well beyond the 
relevant statute of limitations. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-
23(2) (2002) ("An action may be brought within six years . . . 
upon any contract."). 
f21 Plaintiffs' trespass claims concerning the construction and 
patrons' use of the Drive-Through Facilities are also time-
barred. Under Utah law, "[a]n action may be brought within three 
years . . . for . . . trespass upon or injury to real property." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(1) (2002). Wendy's argues, and the 
trial court determined, that because the Drive-Through Facilities 
were first constructed in 1982, the alleged trespass is permanent 
and Plaintiffs' 2004 trespass claims concerning the Drive-Through 
Facilities are therefore time-barred. In response, Plaintiffs 
claim that the statute of limitations does not bar their claims 
because despite the Drive-Through Facilities' construction in 
1982, Wendy's patrons' use of the Drive-Through Facilities and 
Wendy's alleged maintenance of landscaping within the facilities 
constitute a continuing, rather than a permanent, trespass. 
3. Because Wendy's installed the Menu Board Signs in 2003, 
Wendy's concedes that if the Menu Board Signs violate the 
Declaration, Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim regarding the 
Menu Board Signs is not time-barred. 
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1(22 As this court recently noted, ff[t]he distinction between a 
permanent and continuing trespass in Utah is defined in BreicfQar 
Properties, L.C. v. H.E. Davis & Sons, Inc. I", 2002 UT 53, 52 P.3d 
113 3]." Sycamore Family, L.L.C. v. Vintage on the River 
Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., 2006 UT App 387,113, 145 P.3d 1177, cert, 
denied, 153 P.3d 185 (Utah 2007). In BreicfQar, the Utah Supreme 
Court explained: 
"When a cause of action for nuisance or 
trespass accrues for statute of limitations 
purposes depends on whether the nuisance or 
trespass is permanent or continuing. Where a 
nuisance or trespass is of such character 
that it will presumably continue indefinitely 
it is considered permanent, and the 
limitations period runs from the time the 
nuisance or trespass is created. However, if 
the nuisance or trespass may be discontinued 
at any time it is considered continuing in 
character . . . [and] the person injured may 
bring successive actions for damages until 
the nuisance [or trespass] is abated . . . ." 
2002 UT 53 at i|8 (first and third alteration in original) 
(quoting Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902 P.2d 1229, 1232 
(Utah 1995)). In determining whether a trespass is permanent or 
continuing, "we look solely to the act constituting the trespass, 
and not to the harm resulting from the act." Id. at 1|l0. "Under 
this view, the difference between a permanent or continuing 
trespass is purely semantic." Id. at fll. "Once an act of 
trespass has occurred, the statute of limitations begins to run." 
Id. "If there are multiple acts of trespass, then there are 
multiple causes of action, and the statutes of limitations begins 
to run anew with each act." Id. Thus, "[w]e characterize a 
trespass as 'permanent' to acknowledge that the act or acts of 
trespass have ceased to occur [, and w]e characterize a trespass 
as 'continuing' to acknowledge that multiple acts of trespass 
have occurred, and continue to occur." Id. 
^23 Applying the above analysis, the court in Breigcrar 
determined that the defendant's dumping of debris onto the 
plaintiff's property constituted a permanent trespass and that 
the statute of limitations began to run on the date of the 
dumping. See id. at Hl4. The court explained that "[t]he fact 
that the pile of debris continued to remain on [the plaintiff's] 
property, or the possibility that it could be reasonably abated 
is irrelevant to this conclusion." Id. 
1)24 In Sycamore Family, L.L.C. v. Vintage on the River 
Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., this court considered whether 
"underground pipes constitute[d] a continuing trespass because 
water and sewage . . . flow through them on a continual basis." 
2006 UT App 387 at ^2. We explained that such a "contention 
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require[d the court] to consider the nature of the two components 
of the trespass . . . : the pipes themselves and the contents of 
the pipes." Id. at 1[4 . 
We . . . conclude[d] that the pipes 
themselves [were] permanent trespasses 
because, far from being an intermittent 
invader, they ha[d] been a fixture on the 
land for several years, and their 
installation amount[ed] to a single act with 
a single impact on the land. Although the 
water and sewage flowing through the pipes 
were not part of the single act of 
installation, we conclude[d] that such 
contents d[id] not constitute a new trespass. 
"The essential element of trespass is 
physical invasion of the land," or in other 
words, there must be an "encroachment on the 
rights of another." Absent an allegation 
that the contents of the pipes ha [d] leaked 
or otherwise affected the land, the wholly 
enclosed contents of the pipes d[id] not 
constitute a new encroachment onto the land. 
Accordingly, regardless of whether the pipes 
[were] empty or full, the encroachment on 
[the p]laintiffs' rights to the property 
[was] the same. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
[^2 5 We conclude that, like the pile of rocks in Breigcrar and the 
pipes in Sycamore, the act of constructing the Drive-Through 
Facilities was permanent in that " [its] installation amount[ed] 
to a single act with a single impact on the land." Id. We 
further conclude that each use of the Drive-Through Facilities by 
Wendy's patrons does not constitute a new act of trespass 
because, like the waste moving through the pipes in Sycamore, the 
patrons' alleged encroachment on Plaintiffs' property is "wholly 
enclosed" within the Drive-Through Facilities. Id. Accordingly, 
we uphold the trial court's determination that Plaintiffs' 
trespass claim regarding the Drive-Through Facilities is time-
barred. 
%26 We remand, however, the issue of whether the alleged 
maintenance of landscaping within the Drive-Through Facilities 
and the newly-installed fence constitute new or de minimis 
trespasses. The trial court did not address these claims below, 
and the record is insufficient for us to decide these issues on 
appeal. 
III. Inj unct ion 
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K27 Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in "enjoining 
[P]laintiffs from taking any action to inhibit Wendy's from using 
and maintaining the Drive[-]Through Facilities." Namely, 
Plaintiffs argue that although the statute of limitations may bar 
their trespass claim for damages, it does not prevent Plaintiffs 
from obtaining equitable relief to remove the trespass from their 
property. In raising this issue, Plaintiffs notably fail to cite 
any relevant authority to support their position. 
f28 Although, "[i]n addition to damages, [a] plaintiff may seek 
to stop the conduct that is creating the trespass," and although 
"issuance of an injunction to remove the encroachment remains 
discretionary with the court," 9 Richard R. Powell, Powell on 
Real Property § 64A.05[8] (Michael Allen Wolf ed. 2007), the 
question here is whether an equitable remedy of removal is still 
available after the statute of limitations has run. The parties 
do not cite, and we do not find, any Utah law directly on point. 
In at least one state, however, courts have held that requests 
for injunctive relief for the removal of permanent trespasses on 
property are, like trespass claims, barred by the three-year 
statute of limitations. See Field-Escandon v. DeMann, 251 Cal. 
Rptr. 49, 52-53 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); see also Troeger v. Fink, 
332 P.2d 779, 782, 783 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958) (stating that "causes 
of action for damages and for injunctive relief accrue when the 
[permanent] trespass is committed and are barred three years 
thereafter" and that " [g]enerally, the running of an applicable 
statute of limitations will also bar equitable relief").4 
^29 This approach makes sense. After all, the three-year 
statute of limitations bars any trespass "action." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-26(1). Therefore, Plaintiffs cannot assert the 
trespass action that would support their remedy--regardless of 
whether that remedy is equitable or is for damages. 
[^3 0 Even if this were not the case, the Utah Supreme Court has 
held that "[e]quitable claims will be barred after the time fixed 
by the analogous statute of limitations unless extraordinary 
4. The application of the three-year statute of limitations to 
bar removal of the permanent trespass is consistent with the 
distinction between a permanent and continuing trespass. 
Otherwise, the distinction is without consequence as to the 
removal. 
5. Notably, the courts in Breiggar Properties, L.C. v. H.E. 
Davis & Sons, Inc., 2002 UT 53, 52 P.3d 1133, and Sycamore 
Family, L.L.C. v. Vintage on the River Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. , 
2006 UT App 387, 145 P.3d 1177, gave no indication that equitable 
relief to remove the permanent trespass was available to the 
property owner after the statute of limitations on the permanent 
trespass had run. 
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circumstances make the application unjust." CIG Exploration. 
Inc. v. State, 2001 UT 37,^11, 24 P.3d 966; see also Hatch v. 
Hatch, 46 Utah 116, 148 P. 1096, 1101 (1915) ("Generally, in the 
state courts, the statute of limitations applies to equitable as 
well as legal actions."). 
IV. Additional Trespass and Breach of Contract 
Claim Regarding the Alleged New Sign 
^31 Plaintiffs also assert that the trial court erred in failing 
to consider their trespass and breach of contract claims 
concerning the alleged construction of a new sign. We agree and 
remand for the trial court to consider this claim. In addressing 
this claim, the court will need to consider whether the sign is 
permitted under the Declaration. The court will also need to 
clarify where the sign is located, as the record is not clear. 
V. Attorney Fees and Costs 
H32 In granting summary judgment to Wendy's, the trial court 
awarded attorney fees and costs to Wendy's pursuant to the 
Declaration. Plaintiffs contest this award, arguing that: even if 
Plaintiffs are unsuccessful on all their claims, Wendy's is not 
entitled to fees and costs under the language of the Declaration. 
We determine the Declaration is ambiguous as to whether the 
parties intended the fee provision to apply in the present 
circumstances. 
1|33 "In Utah, attorney fees cannot be recovered unless 
authorized by statute or contract." Shipman v. Evans, 2004 UT 
44,f22, 100 P.3d 1151. Here, the Declaration provides that: 
[i]n the event that legal proceedings are 
brought or commenced to enforce any of the 
terms of th[e] Declaration against any 
[o]wner or other party with an interest in 
the Shopping Center, the successful party in 
such action shall then be entitled to receive 
and shall receive from the defaulting Tolwner 
or party a reasonable sum as attorney[] fees 
and costs, to be fixed by the court in the 
same action. 
(Emphasis added.) Plaintiffs contend that under the Declaration 
Wendy's is not entitled to fees and costs because Plaintiffs, 
even if unsuccessful in their claims, do not constitute a 
defaulting party, and that the contracting parties only intended 
the award of fees and costs when the party enforcing the 
Declaration is successful in such enforcement. Wendy's disagrees 
and instead claims that the contracting parties intended 
"defaulting . . . party" to apply more broadly to allow fees in 
circumstances such as here where Plaintiffs were dilatory in 
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bringing the majority of their claims. We conclude that the 
Declaration is unclear as to its terms, see Peterson v. Sunrider 
Corp. , 2002 UT 43,1118, 48 P.3d 918, and each party's 
interpretation tenable, see Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of 
State Lands & Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990), as to 
whether the fee provision applies. We therefore vacate the award 
and direct the trial court to determine, before awarding fees and 
costs on remand, whether the parties intended the fee provision 
to apply in the present circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
1134 First, we affirm the trial court's conclusion that 
Plaintiffs' trespass and breach of contract claims are time-
barred with regard to the Drive-Through Facilities. Second, 
because Plaintiffs' claims regarding the Drive-Through Facilities 
are time-barred, we affirm the trial court's decision to enjoin 
Plaintiffs from taking action to remove the Drive-Through 
Facilities. Third, we reverse and remand the trial court's 
determination that the Declaration permits the Menu Board Signs. 
Fourth, we remand for the trial court to address Plaintiffs' 
trespass claims concerning Wendy's alleged maintenance of 
landscaping within the Drive-Through Facilities and its purported 
installation of a new fence on Plaintiffs' property. Fifth, we 
remand for the trial court to consider Plaintiffs' claims 
concerning the alleged newly-installed sign. Finally, we vacate 
the trial court's award of attorney fees and costs and direct the 
court to determine on remand whether the parties intended the fee 
provision to apply under the facts of this case. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
K35 WE CONCUR: 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge 
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